不完全信息动态Cournot-Bertrand多维博弈模型及其均衡  

Dynamic Cournot-Bertrand multidimensional game and its equilibrium under incomplete information

作　　者：马国顺[1] 蔡红[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北师范大学数学与统计学院,甘肃兰州730070

出　　处：《西北师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第6期29-34,共6页Journal of Northwest Normal University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71061012);国家自然科学青年基金资助项目(11001223)

摘　　要：在不完全信息条件下,讨论两企业对具有一定替代性的两种产品的动态Cournot-Bertrand二维博弈模型及其均衡,证明了两企业对这两种产品联合博弈的策略优于对每一种产品单独博弈的策略,同时说明两企业关于不存在替代性的两产品联合博弈的精炼贝叶斯二维纳什均衡结果相当于两企业分别对每种产品单独进行博弈的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡结果的简单组合.结论表明企业在决策时,应充分考虑产品之间的替代性及其影响,使企业利润最大化.Under incomplete information , the paper discusses dynamic multidimensional Cournot-Bertrand game model and its equilibrium of two kinds of product with certain substitution . It is proved that two products of two firms united game＇s strategies are better than single game＇s strategies . The same time , united game perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for two kinds of products without certain substitution between two firms is equivalently single game perfect Bayesian-Nash for two products . So when the enterprises make decision , they should consider substitution and influence between products , making the enterprise profit maximization .

关 键 词：不完全信息 替代性 动态 精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]