基于群体博弈的产业共性技术创新“市场失灵”研究  

Research on the Market Failure of Industrial Generic Technology Based on Group Game

作　　者：李国昊[1] 李滕滕 李守伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,212013

出　　处：《上海经济研究》2013年第11期86-95,F0003,共11页Shanghai Journal of Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(11BJL074);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(10YJAZH042);江苏省高校人文社科项目(09SJB630015);江苏大学人才基金

摘　　要：产业共性技术创新可以为跨产业革命提供平台支撑,面临着"市场失灵"的问题。首先分析了产业共性技术创新"市场失灵"的研究现状;然后从博弈的角度,构建了群体博弈模型,分析了对称和非对称的纳什均衡;其次,给出了案例分析;最后构建了联盟博弈模型,分析了其稳定性。研究发现,群体博弈中,非对称纳什均衡有利于产业共性技术创新,而对称纳什均衡却会导致"市场失灵",需要构建创新联盟进行产业共性技术创新;恰当、合理的收益分配可以保证联盟博弈的稳定性。The innovation of industrial generic technology （IGT） as the foundation and platform of across industrial revolution is hindered by ＂market failure＂ issue. Firstly, the research status of IGT is provided; then, the group game model is constructed, symmetric and asymmetric Nash equilibrium are analyzed; then, two cases are analyzed; at last, the league game model is constructed and its stability is also analyzed. The conclusions are as following： asymmetric Nash equilibrium is good for the innovation of IGT in group game. However, the symmetric Nash equilibrium results in ＂market failure＂, so the innovation league is required for IGT. The suitable and reasonable income distribution could ensure the stability of league game, then promote the innovation of IGT.

关 键 词：产业共性技术 市场失灵 群体博弈 实证分析联盟博弈 

分 类 号：F403.6[经济管理—产业经济]