财政分权、公务员工资与政府规模大小——基于系统广义矩回归分析的研究  

Fiscal Decentralization,Wages of Civil Servants and Government Size

作　　者：彭锻炼[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计学院财税学院,上海201620

出　　处：《财经论丛》2013年第6期23-30,共8页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：上海市教委科研创新基金资助项目(13YS112);上海立信会计学院"税务专业教育高地"资助项目(1131IA1307)

摘　　要：以公务员工资作为财政分权影响政府规模的传导途径和微观基础,利用我国1995-2009年30个省、市、自治区的面板数据作为样本,采用动态回归方法—系统广义矩进行实证研究,发现:(1)财政支出分权会扩大政府支出规模,而财政收入分权有利于地方政府缩减支出规模;公务员工资水平对政府支出规模扩张有推动作用;(2)财政收入分权与公务员工资水平正相关;全社会工资水平和人均GDP对公务员工资水平有增长作用;而居民消费物价指数却与公务员工资水平负相关;(3)目前,我国地方政府公务员工资水平还不能成为财政分权影响地方政府支出规模的微观基础。并在此基础上提出了相应的参考建议。What are conduction mechanism and micro-foundation of fiscal decentralization which affects the size of government？ This paper regards civil servant wages as pathway and the microeconomic foundation of fiscal decentralization affecting government size by adopting panel data of Chlna＇s 30 provinces during the years of 1995 - 2009 as samples dynamic regression model-System GMM to make theoretical analysis and empirical research. We found that： （i） the fiscal expenditure decentralization would expand government size, but fiscal revenue decentralization would cut local governments size. The civil servants＇ wages promoted the government size. （ii） Fiscal revenue decentralization was positively correlated with civil servants＇ wage. Society average wages and per capita GDP expanded civil servants＇ wages. The consumer price index was negatively correlated with civil servants＇ wages. （iii） At present, China＇s local government civil servants＇ wages could not be the microeconomic basis of fiscal decentralization＇s affecting local government size. At last, we draw some policy recommendations based on the findings.

关 键 词：财政分权 公务员工资 政府规模 系统广义矩方法 

分 类 号：F810.2[经济管理—财政学]