基于触发策略的企业动态联盟利益分配博弈  

Profit Allocation Game in Dynamic Alliances Based on the Trigger Strategy

作　　者：丁绒[1] 孙延明[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510641

出　　处：《系统工程》2013年第10期55-61,共7页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(50675069;71071059);中央高校基本科研业务费专项(2011ZM0036);广东省软科学研究计划项目(2011B070300100)

摘　　要：在关系契约理论和演化博弈理论的框架下,构建了企业动态联盟的利益分配博弈模型。重点探讨了重复性合作情境中,在考虑利益的时间价值后,企业的不同触发策略选择对联盟利益分配机制的影响及原因,并与一次性合作情境进行比较,导出了6个重要的相关结论。通过数值模拟分析,对所得结论进行了验证。较好解决了一次性和重复性合作的利益分配原则及易于维护联盟长期稳定的策略问题,可切实指导联盟利益分配协议的签订。Under the framework of Relational Contract Theory and Evolutionary Game Theory, it constructs a profits allocation game model in dynamic alliances and focuses on the influence of selecting the different trigger strategies on profits allocation mechanism and causes in a repeatability cooperation situation, after considering time value of profits, which is compared with a one-time cooperation situation, six important conclusions are derived. Through numerical simulation analysis, conclusions are verified. These two problems are better solved： profit allocation principle of one-time and repeatability cooperation, and strategy liable to maintain the long-term stability in alliances which provides practical guidance to the signing of the agreement of profits allocation among alliances.

关 键 词：动态联盟 利益分配 重复合作博弈 触发策略 折现率 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]