基于信息流的整数漏洞插装和验证  

Statically Detect and Run-Time Check Integer-Based Vulnerabilities with Information Flow

作　　者：孙浩[1,2] 李会朋[1,2] 曾庆凯[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]计算机软件新技术国家重点实验室(南京大学),江苏南京210093 [2]南京大学计算机科学与技术系,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《软件学报》2013年第12期2767-2781,共15页Journal of Software

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(61170070;90818022;61021062);国家科技支撑计划(2012BAK26B01);国家高技术研究发展计划(863)(2011AA1A202)

摘　　要：为降低整数漏洞插装验证的运行开销,提出基于信息流的整数漏洞插装方法.从限定分析对象范围的角度出发,将分析对象约减为污染信息流路径上的所有危险整数操作,以降低静态插装密度.在GCC平台上,实现了原型系统DRIVER(detect and run-time check integer-based vulnerabilities with information flow).实验结果表明,该方法具有精度高、开销低、定位精确等优点.An approach to detecting integer-based vulnerabilities is proposed based on information-flow analysis in order to improve the run-time performance. In this approach, only the unsafe integer operations on tainted information flow paths, which can be controlled by users and involved in sensitive operations, need to be instrumented with run-time check code, so that both the density of static instrumentation and performance overhead are reduced. Based on this approach, a prototype system called DRIVER （detect and run-time check integer-based vulnerabilities with information flow） is implemented as an extension to the GCC compiler and tested on a number of real-world applications. The experimental results show that this approach is effective, scalable, light-weight and capable of locating the root cause.

关 键 词：整数漏洞 信息流 污点分析 插装 

分 类 号：TP311[自动化与计算机技术—计算机软件与理论]