一个可抵抗临时指数泄露的密钥协商协议形式化安全模型  

Formal Security Model Resisting Session Exponential Reveal for Key Agreement Protocol

作　　者：陶文君[1] 胡斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]解放军信息工程大学,郑州450004

出　　处：《计算机科学》2013年第11期98-102,共5页Computer Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(61272488;61272041;61202491)资助

摘　　要：从临时指数泄露这一新的假设出发,分析了eCK模型下临时指数泄露可能造成的安全隐患,提出了可抵抗临时指数泄露的新安全属性,建立了攻击者具有更强能力的新形式化安全模型。在该模型下,给出了一个可证明安全的HCMQV密钥协商协议,该协议在CMQV的基础上对参数e的生成方式做了自然的修改并增加了保密性,以有效减少协议执行中杂凑的次数和抵抗反射攻击。为了证明协议的安全性,没有沿用HMQV协议证明签名机制不可伪造性的方法,而是通过构造区分器将新协议的安全性紧凑地归约到DDH问题上。事实证明,设计临时指数可泄露的安全密钥协商协议是可行的。Based on the assurnption of ephemeral exponential leakage in eCK model, this paper analyzed the effect of this hidden trouble and built a new formal security model in which a much stronger adversary can be resisted and also a new security attribute can be satisfied. Futher more, a provable secure key agreement protocol-HCMQV was designed in this new model. The protocol modifies the generation function of e in a natural way and makes it in secrecy. The method re- duces the times of HASH and also the reflect attack can be avoided. In order to prove the security of HCMQV,we did not prove the unforgeability for the signature scheme like HMQV, but a distinguisher was constructed to reduce the se- curity of protocol to DDH assumption tightly. Actually, designing a secure key agreement protocol in which ephemeral exponential can be leaked is possible.

关 键 词：CMQV eCK 形式化安全模型 可证明安全性 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]