双边成本信息不对称的供应链协调机制  

The Coordination Mechanism of Supply Chain with Bilateral Asymmetric Costs Information

作　　者：王新辉[1] 汪贤裕[1] 苏应生[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学工商管理学院,四川成都610064 [2]西南财经大学统计学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2013年第4期196-204,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071103)

摘　　要：研究了分散决策结构下的具有双边不对称成本信息的供应链协调问题。考虑了由一个制造商和一个销售商组成的二级供应链,制造商和销售商分别拥有私人的制造成本信息和销售成本信息。为实现有效激励,引入了利他委托人这一概念,以供应链作为协调主体。为了实现成本信息的真实揭示,引入了AGV(d'Aspremont和Gerard-Varet)机制,并且在此基础上建立非对称信息下的供应链模型。在集中决策下,给出系统的最优商品交易量作为分析的基准。在分散决策的情况下,证明了在AGV机制的作用下,制销双方不仅能够真实的报告私人的成本信息,而且由双方成本确定的商品交易量等于完全信息下的最优商品交易量。此外,为了公平的分配实现的链收益,给出了一个基于双方期望信息租金的分配规则。在此分配规则的基础上设计了一组改进的转移支付,基于改进的转移支付提出了一个协调机制。该机制不仅能真实的揭示信息还能够实现供应链协调。最后给出一个数值算例对文章的主要结论进行说明。Bilateral asymmetric information in supply chains has become a common phenomenon. The party who possesses information often conceals his information for better performance, resulting in the inefficiency of supply chain. Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate the coordination mechanism for improving information sharing and the whole supply chain performance. This paper addresses the coordination of supply chain with bilateral asymmetric information. More specifically, we consider a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer which have their private information regarding the manufacturing cost and retail cost respectively. In the first part, we review studies on the supply chain with asymmetric information. We find that information sharing mechanism has attracted substantial attention of many scholars. However, only a few researchers are motivated to explore supply chain coordination mechanisms under the bilateral asymmetric information scenario. In the second part, we investigate how the manufacturer and the retailer reveal information to each other and how they achieve supply chain coordination under the bilateral information situation. To improve .the operational efficiency, we introduce the benevolent principal concept. Thus, the whole supply chain can be seen as a coordination subject. To solve the problem of asymmetric information revealing, we first introduce the AGV （d＇Aspremont and Gerard-Varet） mechanism and construct a model based on the mechanism. In the centralized situation, the optimal commodity trading quantity is used as a benchmark. In the decentralized setting, we prove that the private information is revealed truthfully by using the AGV mechanism. Meanwhile, the manufacturer and retailer will maximize their individual profit by announcing the true cost information. Thus the optimal commodity trading quantity determined by the private cost information equals to the optimal commodity trading quantity in the setting of symmetric information. Therefore, supply chain coo

关 键 词：供应链协调 利他委托人 AGV机制 双边不对称信息 双边逆向选择 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]