基于风险偏好的PPP项目风险分担博弈模型  

The Risk Share Game Model of PPP Project Based on Risk Preference

作　　者：王颖林[1,2] 刘继才[1] 赖芨宇[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610000 [2]福建农林大学交通与土木工程学院,福建福州350001

出　　处：《建筑经济》2013年第12期44-47,共4页Construction Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901065);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-10-0703)

摘　　要：从PPP项目风险分担机制的原则出发,采用合作博弈方法,构建政府与投资部门基于不同风险偏好系数的博弈模型;应用Nash协商对策理论确定分价值函数的合并规则,建立公私双方共同分担风险的净收益函数模型,并分析风险偏好系数与风险分担比例之间的关系。数值模拟表明,该模型可以确定基于双方风险偏好的最优风险分担比例,并且可以使经过风险分配后的风险净收益为最优。PPP （ publicprivate partnership ）has been rapidly developed in the world wide, reasonable risksharing be tween government and private sectors plays a crucial role in the implementation of the PPP project. This paper con structs a PPP project risk sharing cooperate game model based on the risk preference factors of government and private sectors. On the basis of Nash negotiation theory, suitable the merging rules of value function should be chosen, then a multiple value function would be obtained, the relationship between the risk preference coefficient and risk sharing ra tio has been analyzed. Numerical simulations show that the model could determine the optimal risk sharing ratio accord ing to different risk preference and maximize the net risk income.

关 键 词：PPP项目 风险分担 风险偏好 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]