我国上市公司经理人动机对费用粘性影响研究  

Impact of Different Manager Incentives on Cost Stickiness in Chinese Public Companies

作　　者：李粮[1,2] 赵息[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072 [2]山西财经大学会计学院,太原030031

出　　处：《天津大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第6期512-518,共7页Journal of Tianjin University：Social Sciences

基　　金：教育部博士点基金资助项目(20110032110035);天津大学自主创新基金资助项目

摘　　要：以我国2001—2012年持续上市的公司为样本,研究经理人最优决策动机和盈余管理动机两种不同动机对费用粘性的影响。实证研究表明,经理人最优决策动机会导致较高的费用粘性水平;具有保盈动机的样本公司,费用的对称性表现得更明显;而具有新股发行动机的公司,费用表现出反粘性的特征。上述研究厘清了不同经理人动机对费用习性的影响路径,为企业通过费用比率进行经理人绩效考核提供了更为全面的理论指导。Based on the data of Chinese public companies from 2001 to 2012, this paper studies the impact of manager＇ s optimal decision incentive and earnings management incentive on cost stickiness. It is found that manager＇ s optimal deci- sion incentive causes high level of cost stickiness; companies reporting positive earnings exhibit a more symmetric cost be- havior; companies planning new share exhibit cost anti-stickiness. The results help us to understand the paths that different manager incentives influence cost stickiness and provide more comprehensive theoretical supports for companies to evaluate manager＇ s performance with cost ratio.

关 键 词：经理人 最优决策动机 盈余管理动机 费用粘性 

分 类 号：F234.3[经济管理—会计学]