An Empirical Study on the Cadre Responsibility System of Local Government in China  

作　　者：Liu Mingxing Hou Linke Tao Ran 

机构地区：[1]China Institute for Educational Finance Research, Peking University, Beijing, China [2]Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan, China [3]School of Economics, Renmin University of China Center for Urban Development and Land Policy, the PKU-Lincoln Institute, Beijing, China

出　　处：《China Economist》2013年第6期82-97,共16页中国经济学人（英文版）

摘　　要：Based on nationally representative panel data, this paper examines the content and evolution of China＇s cadre responsibility system at county-township and township- village levels. Our findings suggest that, with abolition of agricultural tax, there has been a series of changes in the focus of evaluation both at county-township and township-village levels. In county-township evaluation system, importance of economic development and social stability grew but fiscal pressure did not weaken; while in township-village system, original indicator of fiscal pressure became less important. Meanwhile, by enhancing ＂veto＂ indicator of evaluation on village cadres, township government attempted to cascade the pressure of social stability to village administration. Although central government has initiated a series of reforms on agriculture, countryside and farmers, county and township governments did not pay more attention to rural infrastructure. In addition, county government paid less and less attention to farmers＇ income growth.

关 键 词：abolition of agricultural tax cadre responsibility system Priority Targets er 

分 类 号：F127[经济管理—世界经济] X32[环境科学与工程—环境工程]