Tracing Ultimate Shareholders＇ Double Control Chain in Listed Companies- Using the Theory of Organizational Routine Evolution  

作　　者：Gao Chuang Guo Bin 

机构地区：[1]College of Business Administration, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, China [2]School of International Business, Beijing International Studies University, Beijing, China

出　　处：《China Economist》2013年第6期112-123,共12页中国经济学人（英文版）

基　　金：Phased results of fund project： ＂Study on the Ultimate Shareholder＇s Control and Deprivation in Listed Companies from the Perspective of Social Capital,＂ sponsored by National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant No. 71072072）; ＂Study on Ultimate Control Rights of China＇s Listed Companies from the Perspective of Social Capital,＂ sponsored by Graduate Innovation Fund of Capital University of Economics and Business （Grant No.CUEB2010507）.

摘　　要：Based on the epistemology and methodology of organizational routine evolution, this paper presents a systematic analysis on how ultimate shareholders control listed companies by means of equity control chain in a pyramid structure and social capital control chain hidden in social networks. First, this paper examines the internal logic of ultimate shareholders＇ double control chain and designs an iterative model for dynamic evolution intent proceeding from ultimate shareholders ＇degree of intent for social capital control. Finally, with the case study of Inner Mongolia Caoyuan Xingfa Co., Ltd., this paper reveals the process and mechanism of ultimate shareholders＇ creation of double control chain.

关 键 词：ultimate shareholders equity control chain social capital control chain routine evolution 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置] F279.246[自动化与计算机技术—控制科学与工程]