董事会特征、CEO权力与现金股利政策——基于中国上市公司的实证研究  

Board of Directors' Characteristics,CEO Power and Cash Dividend Policy

作　　者：冯慧群[1,2] 马连福[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《管理评论》2013年第11期123-132,共10页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71372093);国家自然科学基金重点项目(71132001);教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(10JJD630001)

摘　　要：本文基于代理理论和信号理论,以2008-2011年间中国上市公司为研究对象,考察董事会特征的三个方面——独立性、网络性和稳定性对现金股利政策的影响,结果发现董事会独立性对现金股利分配倾向没有影响;而董事会网络性和稳定性均对现金股利分配倾向具有显著正影响。此外,本文通过构建CEO权力指数,发现CEO权力在董事会特征作用于现金股利政策中具有调节作用,其效果是减弱董事会网络性和稳定性对现金股利分配倾向的影响。In this paper, we use data of Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2011 to examine board of directors＇ characteristics and cash dividend policy based on agency theory and signal theory. The board of directors＇ characteristics consist of independence, network and stability. We find board of directors＇ independence characteristics have no effect on cash dividend, because in Chinese capital mar-ket most of listed companies just abide by the regulations and don＇ t want to increase the number of independent directors. On the other hand, we find board of directors＇ network and stability characteristics have positive effect on cash dividend. Also, we build CEO power index, then we reason that CEO power play a regulatory role between board of director＇ characteristics and cash dividend policy. CEO power can weaken board of directors＇ characteristics affecting cash dividend pay.

关 键 词：董事会特征 现金股利 代理理论 信号理论 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F276.6F832.51