代理冲突、董事会质量与“污点”审计师变更  

Who Cares Auditor's Reputation? Evidence from “Dirty”Auditor Switch Decision

作　　者：刘笑霞[1] 李明辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学会计学系,211100 [2]南京大学会计学系,210093

出　　处：《会计研究》2013年第11期67-74,96,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(11YJC790124);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272099;71072043);江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目(2010ZDIXM025)的资助

摘　　要：当审计师因受监管部门处罚而致声誉受损时,公司变更"污点"审计师表明其对高质量审计服务存在较大需求。本文利用2002-2010年间被中国证监会处罚的会计师事务所及其上市公司客户数据,从代理冲突和董事会质量的角度,考察相关因素对上市公司变更其声誉受损审计师决策的影响。结果发现,就代理冲突变量而言,当原审计师受到处罚后,股权集中度与审计师变更之间呈显著正向关系,而财务杠杆及管理层是否持股与审计师变更之间没有表现出显著的关系;就董事会质量而言,董事会的规模、独立性和勤勉性与"污点"审计师变更之间均未表现出显著关联,仅是否同时设立四个专门委员会与"污点"审计师变更之间呈显著正向关系。After auditors' reputations are compromised,switching auditors indicates that listed companies have the demand for high quality audit. By using the data of listed clients of auditors disciplined by CSRC through 2002 to 2010,this paper investigates the influence of relevant factors on the decision to switch'dirty'auditors. The empirical results show that:( 1) As to agency conflict variables,ownership concentration has the significant positive effect on auditor switch,but managerial stockholding and leverage have not the significant effect;( 2) As to BOD quality variables,whether to simultaneously set up four independent special committees under board of directors is significantly correlated with'dirty'auditor switch,however,the size,independence and diligence of the board are not significantly correlated with'dirty'auditor switch.

关 键 词：审计师变更 审计需求 审计师声誉 代理冲突 董事会 

分 类 号：F239.22[经济管理—会计学] F224[经济管理—国民经济]