XBRL、代理成本与绩效水平——基于中国开放式基金市场的证据  

XBRL,Agency Costs and Performance: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry in China

作　　者：曾建光[1,2,3] 伍利娜[1,2,3] 谌家兰 王立彦[1,2,3] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,611130 [2]北京大学光华管理学院,100871 [3]台湾政治大学

出　　处：《会计研究》2013年第11期88-94,96,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71172029;70772006;71132004);西南财经大学引进人才科研启动资助项目"基于XBRL的内部控制信息披露及其经济后果研究"的资助

摘　　要：从2010年开始,中国证监会强制要求所有基金公司采用XBRL在唯一指定的官方网站上披露年报等信息,同时提供在线XBRL阅读器以方便投资者查阅相关信息。基于此,本文考察XBRL的采用对于开放式基金代理成本及其相关经济后果的影响,研究发现,强制采用XBRL,降低了开放式基金的代理成本,同时提升了开放式基金的绩效水平。研究表明这一新的披露方式,减少了投资者的信息搜索成本以及投资者与基金经理之间的信息不对称,从而促进了投资者作为委托人对于代理人行为的有效监督。The China Securities Regulatory Commission has mandated the XBRL as the only financial reporting technology to file the daily reports,quarterly reports,annual reports and funds notices of mutual funds since 2010. The XBRL mandate is implemented with the free online XBRL reader provided by CSRC to facilitate the investors to access financial information in a timely manner. This global and revolutionary approach to information disclosure greatly reduces the investors' information search costs. Information asymmetry has been mitigated due to the XBRL mandate. This regulatory change provides us a natural experiment context to study the relation of mutual funds' pre-and post-adoption agency costs and performance. Our findings show that the mandatory adoption of XBRL has decreased the agency costs and increased the fund performance.

关 键 词：XBRL 开放式基金 代理成本 

分 类 号：F232[经济管理—会计学] F832.5[经济管理—国民经济]