理论与评价:NBA运动员工资的研究  

Theory and Evaluation:Research on the Salary of NBA Players

作　　者：朱亚坤[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《北京体育大学学报》2013年第11期38-43,共6页Journal of Beijing Sport University

基　　金：江西省社会科学"十二五"规划项目:资源.市场.竞争:职业体育全球化研究(编号:11TY18)

摘　　要：采用文献资料法和数理统计法对NBA运动员工资进行理论和实证研究。结果认为:联盟和工会在双边垄断的职业体育劳动力市场上都拥有一定的市场垄断力,雇用量和工资依双方议价能力在一定范围内变化;运动员的工资是在NBA劳资协议的框架下,由其和球队通过谈判确定,是市场供求关系的反映。NBA运动员平均获得其边际收入产品的18.4%;球队的竞价使明星运动员获得较高支付比例。劳资协议对最小雇用量的规定和为特殊培训付费使替补运动员获得了能够补偿、甚至高于边际收入产品的工资,支付比例较高;新秀运动员以降低工资的方式支付一般培训的费用,支付比例较低。为推动中国职业体育劳动力市场运行机制的建立提供理论和实证支持。：Using methods of literature consultation and mathematical statistics, this paper focus on the salary of NBA players based on a perspective of theory and empirical evidence. The results suggest league and labor union have certain power in the bilateral monopoly of labor market of professional sports, and employment and salary fluctuate in a certain range according to the bargaining ability of two sides. The salaries of players are determined by demand and supply in the labor market under the framework of the NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement. NBA players gain an average of 18.4% of Marginal Revenue Product. Bidding war among teams brings star players higher payment rate, whereas players with lower salary gain lower proportion of payment. Regulations of Collective Bargaining Agreement for the minimum employment and expenses for special training make substituted players gain the salary that offset or even exceed the value they create, gaining higher payment rate. Rookie players pay for general training by the reduction of salary rate, and compared with other qualified players, payment rate is lower. This article provides theoretical and empirical support to the establishment of operation mechanism in Chinese pro- fessional sports labor market.

关 键 词：职业运动员 工资 NBA 劳资协议 边际收入产品 市场供求关系 

分 类 号：G841[文化科学—体育训练]