并发环境下可否认的环认证协议  

Deniable ring authentication in concurrent setting

作　　者：曾晟珂[1] 秦志光[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学计算机科学与工程学院,成都611731

出　　处：《计算机应用研究》2013年第12期3745-3748,3752,共5页Application Research of Computers

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61133016);国家重大专项项目(2011ZX03002-002-03)

摘　　要：利用基于时限的承诺方案、非交互式零知识证明系统以及环签名算法,提出了一个可否认的环认证协议。在提出的协议中,即使环内所有成员的私钥都被俘获,协议的匿名性仍然保持。与相关的可否认的环认证协议相比,提出的协议通信轮数最少。证明表明,该可否认的环认证协议满足消息源匿名性、健壮性,并且在并发环境下仍然保持可否认性。Based on timed commitment, non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system and ring signature, this work proposed a deniable ring authentication protocol which adapted to concurrent setting. Although all the private keys of the group were corrupted, it also achieved the anonymity of this authentication protocol. Compared to the related works, the communication round of this protocol was optimal （ only two rounds）. The formal proof shows that this deniable ring authentication protocol satisfies source anonymity and soundness, and the deniability can hold in concurrent setting.

关 键 词：并发可否认性 可否认的环认证 基于时限的承诺 非交互式零知识证明系统 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]