承包商在工程建设各阶段的寻租博弈  

Contractor's rent-seeking game in different stages of construction

作　　者：武英利[1] 彭丰[2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072 [2]湖北省电力公司,湖北武汉430077

出　　处：《武汉大学学报（工学版）》2013年第6期780-783,共4页Engineering Journal of Wuhan University

摘　　要：在博弈论和寻租理论的基础上,对承包商、监理单位以及业主之间的博弈关系进行了分析,探讨了承包商在招投标阶段向业主寻租以及在施工阶段与监理单位合谋寻租的行为及其对社会福利的影响,分别构建了招投标阶段多个承包商之间的寻租博弈模型以及施工阶段业主、承包商和监理单位之间的3方博弈模型.博弈均衡结果表明承包商在招投标阶段的寻租总成本与寻租总人数呈正相关,承包商与监理单位在施工阶段合谋寻租的概率与业主监管的力度、积极性呈负相关,并据此提出了防范承包商在工程建设不同阶段寻租行为的方法与建议.Based on the game theory and rent-seeking theory, this paper analyzes the game relations of con- tractor, owner and supervision institution, explores contractor＇s rent-seeking behavior towards owner in bidding stage and towards supervision institution in construction stage and the influences on social welfare, and constructs the rent-seeking game model of multiple contractors and trilateral game model of owner, contractor and supervision institution respectively. The equilibrium results show that the contractors＇ to- tal rent cost is positively correlated with the total number of rent seekers; the probability of contractor col- ludes with supervision institution is negatively correlated with the supervision of owners. Finally, we put forward the methods and advices for preventing the above-mentioned rent-seeking behavior.

关 键 词：工程质量 寻租 博弈论 社会福利 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]