竞争条件下的二度价格歧视博弈分析  

Analysis on Second-Degree Price Discrimination under the Condition of Competition Based on Game Theory

作　　者：高兴佑[1] 

机构地区：[1]曲靖师范学院经济与管理学院,云南曲靖655011

出　　处：《湖南财政经济学院学报》2013年第6期38-43,共6页Journal of Hunan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：云南省哲学社会科学规划办主管项目"云南资源性产品价格改革研究"(项目编号:YB2012020)阶段研究成果之一

摘　　要：在线性需求函数条件下,对两寡头厂商二度价格歧视进行完全信息静态博弈分析,以确定收益最大化的条件,研究结果表明:两寡头厂商对需求量分段实施价格歧视,收益最大化的必要条件是,对需求量进行分段,使各段长度成公比为1/2的等比数列。同时,给出了寡头垄断市场在实施二度价格歧视时的均衡歧视产量和价格以及市场均衡歧视总收益。Under the condition of linear demand function, the method of second - degree price discrimination is analyzed in the case of two oligopoly enterprises by using complete information static game theory to determine the condition of revenue maximization. The results show that： when two oligopoly firms divide demand to enforce price discrimination, the necessary condition of revenue maximization is to divide demand into some intervals and let the length of each ones become geometric series, whose common ratio is 1 / 2. At the same time, equilibrium discriminative production and price and equilibrium discriminative total revenue of market of second - degree price discrimination in the oligopoly market were presented.

关 键 词：寡头垄断市场 二度价格歧视 完全信息静态博弈 古诺模型 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]