强制实际履行规则下无效率合同的履行威胁问题  

Performance Threat Issue of Inefficient Contract under the Compulsory Practical Performance Regulation

作　　者：刘廷华[1] 

机构地区：[1]宜宾学院政府管理学院,四川宜宾644007

出　　处：《宜宾学院学报》2013年第10期35-40,共6页Journal of Yibin University

摘　　要：环境的变化可能使履行合同不再符合效率的要求。但当事人此时可能仍会有威胁实际履行合同的动机,希望藉此提高在违约谈判中的交易能力,得到更多的合作剩余。有些威胁是可信的,有些威胁是不可信的,可信的原告威胁会增加过度补偿的风险,而可信的被告威胁则具有相反的效果。公平和效率要求阻止原告的威胁,法律可以通过赋予实际履行命令不可转让性等方法来实现此目的。The setting changes may result in a fact that a contract performance no longer meets the efficiency require- ments. At that time, however, the contract parties may still have a motivation to threat the practical contract perform- ance ; by this they hope enhance the transaction capabilities in the default negotiation and obtain more cooperative al- location. Some threats are credible, and some threats are not credible. A credible threat to the plaintiff would increase the risk of excessive compensation while the threat of the credible defendant has the opposite effect. Fairness and effi- ciency require transferability preventing the plaintiff＇ s threat, and the law may actually complied with the orders by giving the non- and other methods to achieve this purpose.

关 键 词：无效率履行 威胁 阻止 不可转让 

分 类 号：D923.6[政治法律—民商法学]