基于期权博弈理论的EPC项目投资决策研究  

Investment Decision of EPC Project Based on Option-game Theory

作　　者：谢兵[1] 闫斌杰[1] 李新[1] 张英杰[1] 曾鸣[1] 薛松[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学能源与电力经济研究咨询中心,北京102206

出　　处：《水电能源科学》2013年第12期250-253,共4页Water Resources and Power

摘　　要：政府补贴金额对EMCo投资EPC项目产生的影响是一个值得研究的问题。本文以电力EPC项目的投资决策过程为研究对象,以政府的灵活补贴政策为依据,结合期权博弈模型,构建不确定情况下EPC项目的对称双头垄断投资模型,并在模型中设置价值匹配和平滑条件,研究了投资EPC项目过程中政府补贴对EMCo的影响,获得了EMCo签订节能服务合同的最优阈值和补贴数值及政府补贴的均衡策略,为电力EPC项目的投资决策提供了可靠依据。How much influence can the amount of government subsidies to promote EMCo invest EPC program is an interesting question. The object of this study is the investment decision process of power EPC project. Based on flexible central government subsidies, combined with option-game theory model, this paper establishes a symmetric duopoly model for EPC project of investment under uncertainty. The value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions are set in the model for studying the impact of government subsidies on the EMCo. The optimal thresholds and the value of subsidies for sign energy service contracts, as well as the equilibrium vides a reliable basis for investment decision of power EPC strategiesof government subsidies are obtained. Thus, it pro project.

关 键 词：合同能源管理 投资决策 期权博弈理论 财政补贴 

分 类 号：F206[经济管理—国民经济]