全流通条件下我国上市公司控股股东侵占行为研究  

The Research on the Act of Embezzlement of Controlling Shareholders of Listed Companies in China under Complete Circulation

作　　者：蓝发钦[1] 李永梅[1] 陈小朋[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学金融与统计学院,上海200241

出　　处：《华东师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2013年第6期116-122,152,共7页Journal of East China Normal University（Humanities and Social Sciences）

基　　金：2013年上海市教委科研创新重点项目(14ZS041)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：在借鉴海内外文献关于控股股东行为决策模型的基础上,构建全流通条件下中国上市公司控股股东效用最大化三阶段模型,分析控股股东"掏空"行为、减持行为和"支撑"行为的影响因素,并进行实证研究,其结果表明:控股股东减持前原持股比例、注入增持比例、控制权私有收益乘数和外部法制水平对上市公司控股股东的减持行为决策影响较大,其他变量影响较小。针对全流通条件下控股股东的侵占行为以及各种影响因素的特点,有关方面应当加强外部法制体系建设,完善信息披露制度,注重公司治理,以切实保护中小投资者的利益。Based on the controlling shareholders decision model of the existing literatures,this paper con- structs a three-stage model of controlling shareholders' utility maximization to analyze the influence factors of the controlling shareholders' tunneling,unloading and sustaining behaviors. Empirical studies show that the unloading behavior of controlling shareholders is primary determined by the controlling shareholders' original shareholding ratio,injection or share repurchase ratio,private benefits multiplier of the controlling stake,and the external legal environment. Considering the embezzlement of the controlling shareholder under complete circulation and its principal causes,external legal system,information disclosure,corporate governance are all aspects that deserve much attention to protect the interests of the market participants,especially individual investors.

关 键 词：控股股东 侵占行为 支撑行为 上市公司 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F224