中国啤酒市场的四寡头价格博弈及其延迟决策  

Four-oligarchy price game and its delayed decision in Chinese beer market

作　　者：马军海[1] 吴可菲[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2013年第6期717-728,共12页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61273231)

摘　　要：根据中国啤酒市场往年的销量数据,判断出其目前为较典型的四寡头垄断市场.继而基于厂商采用延迟有限理性决策的假设建立了市场的动态博弈模型.应用复杂系统理论分析研究了系统的稳定性,分岔以及混沌等复杂性态,并以此为基础研究了不同参数组合条件下的系统动态演化过程和寡头竞争态势.最后,应用延迟反馈控制法对系统混沌进行了控制,数值模拟结果验证了理论的正确性,且适当选取控制因子可使系统维持在稳定状态下.这一研究结果对中国啤酒厂商的价格决策有很好的借鉴作用.According to sales data of Chinese beer market in former years, we get the conclusion that Chinese beer market is now a more typical four-oligarchy market. Then a dynamic game model is established, and the firms are presumed to make decisions with delayed bounded rationality. Have a theoretic analysis to the complexity of the system such as stability, fractal and chaos, and then based on it, we have the research the system＇s dynamic behavior and oligarch competing states under different parameter composition conditions. At last, the delay feedback control method is employed to control the system＇s chaos. The results of numerical simulation show the correction of the theory and point out that this system can be maintained in a steady state by choosing a proper controlling determinant. The results provide a very good reference of the price decision making to beer manufacturers in China.

关 键 词：价格博弈 有限理性 延迟 内在复杂性 混沌控制 

分 类 号：TP391.9[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]