VMCI下供应链模糊需求信息共享价值与协调  

Value of information sharing and coordination in supply chain under fuzzy demand and VMCI environments

作　　者：王小斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2013年第6期795-803,共9页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171122);山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2010GL009)

摘　　要：在需求为模糊变量的情况下,考察并比较了两级供应链中,供应商和零售商在采用传统零售商管理库存和新的信息共享方式——供应商管理寄售库存(VMCI)下的期望收益变化情况.通过比较,发现采用供应商管理寄售库存有利于零售商,但未必有利于供应商.进一步发现在满足一定条件的情况下,VMCI方式下的整个供应链的期望收益要大于传统库存管理方式下供应链的期望收益.为使VMCI方式下的供应链实现协调,本文还设计了基于数量柔性和转移支付的激励契约并证明其能够实现供应链的完美协调.数值算例进一步表明文中所给出的结论是正确的,所设计的协调契约是有效的.Under the fuzzy market demand environment, the varieties of the expected profits for the supplier and the retailer in a two-echelon supply chain are considered when they operate in traditional retailer managed in- ventory and a new information sharing method--vendor managed consignment inventory （VMCI）, respectively. Comparisons of the retailer＇s expected profit and the supplier＇s expected profit in these two environments re- spectively find that it＇s benefit for the retailer to apply the VMCI, but it＇s not always benefit for the supplier to do so. Also if a special condition is met, then the expected profit of the whole supply chain in VMCI is giver than that in traditional retailer managed inventory method. In order to coordinate the supply chain in VMCI, an incentive contract based on quantity flexibility and transfer payments is designed and then it is proved that this contract can achieve perfect coordination of the supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is presented to demonstrate the correctness of the results and the effectiveness of the incentive contract designed in this paper.

关 键 词：供应商管理寄售库存 信息共享 模糊需求 可信性理论 

分 类 号：F253.9[经济管理—国民经济]