竞争环境下客户服务投入对企业利润影响的均衡分析  被引量:1

Equilibrium Analysis of the Impact of Service Expenses on Firm Value in a Competitive Market

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作  者:郑晓娜[1] 

机构地区:[1]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871

出  处:《中国管理科学》2013年第6期113-122,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基  金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70902015;71272039)

摘  要:客户服务投入是企业吸引新顾客和维持现有顾客的重要手段之一。然而,服务投入究竟是否能给企业带来价值?对于这一问题,业界和学界都没有明确的答案。本文通过建模的方法研究在竞争的市场环境下,固有的市场因素对客户服务投入价值的影响。研究发现,服务竞争的市场均衡结构是两家厂商都投入客户服务。服务投入给企业带来的价值随着产品差异度的提高而提高,随着厂商自身市场份额的增加而增加。即,在产品差异度高的市场,服务投入更容易给企业带来价值。而在集中度高的市场,服务投入更容易给市场份额大的企业带来价值。Firms invest in services to attract new customers and to keep existing ones. However, it is not clear whether service expenses will improve firm profitability. Through analytical modeling, the impact of market factors on firm value in a competitive market is investigated in this paper. A deterministic demand model that captures two firms' pricing and service competition is employed and the degree of product differentiation and market concentration is incorporated. Firms' optimal decisions are compared in three scenarios: (I) firms engage in price competition and neither invests in customer service; (II) One firm makes decision on price and service investment and the other only on price; (III) Both firms make price and service investment decisions simultaneously. By comparing the equilibrium profits across the three scenarios, it can be found that in equilibrium, both firms invest in customer service. In particular, the value of service expenses increases with the degree of product differentiation, and the firm's market share. That is, in a market featuring high product differentiation, service expenses will bring higher value to the firm. And in a highly concentrated market, service expenditure is more likely to create higher value for the firm with a larger market share.

关 键 词:服务投入 产品差异度 市场集中度 

分 类 号:C931[经济管理—管理学]

 

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