基于智力资本贡献的“单核”型虚拟研发团队最优激励契约机制博弈  

Game Analysis of Optimal Incentive Contract Mechanism in the “Single-core”Virtual R&D Team based on Intellectual Capital Contribution

作　　者：王挺[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南理工大学经济管理学院,河南焦作454000

出　　处：《科技与经济》2013年第6期91-95,共5页Science & Technology and Economy

基　　金：河南省软科学研究计划项目--"知识组织的人才积聚战略研究"(项目编号:092400410039;项目负责人:任长江)成果之一

摘　　要：虚拟研发团队是知识经济时代下为了追求智力资本的整合、获取技术竞争优势的一种新兴研发组织形式。由于信息不对称,导致虚拟研发团队成员的激励问题面临前所未有的挑战。从团队成员智力资本贡献的角度出发,设计出虚拟研发团队相关的激励制度,并运用博弈论建立一类常见的虚拟团队形式———"单核"型虚拟研发团队的最优激励契约机制模型,通过求解从理论上提出优化团队激励契约机制的设计建议,为该类虚拟研发团队的运行提供理论指导。In knowledge economic period, Virtual R＆D team as a new kind of R＆D organizational mode can pursuit the intellectu- al capital integration and technical competitive advantage. Because asymmetrie information often leads to insufficient incentive for the members of virtual team. In this paper, there establishes an optimal incentive contract mechanism model of a common virtual team form -- ＂single-core＂ virtual R＆D team by using game theory from the perspective of intellectual capital contribution and designs some kinds of incentive systems related to virtual R＆D team. By solving the model it theoretically gives some suggestions on the design of optimal incentive contract, which provides theoretical guidance to the operation of the virtual R＆D team.

关 键 词：“单核”型虚拟研发团队 智力资本贡献 最优激励契约机制 博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F272.92