“扩招”隐藏的逻辑--基于劳动力市场的最优教育标准设计  

The Hidden Logic of Enrollment Expansion:Optimal Educational Standards Design based on Labor Markets

作　　者：姚东旻[1,2] 宫汝凯[3] 徐淼[4] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学经济学院 [2]中央财经大学 [3]东华大学旭日工商管理学院 [4]中央财经大学研究生院

出　　处：《南方经济》2013年第12期28-38,共11页South China Journal of Economics

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金(13D210803);东华大学文科预研究项目(108-10-018153)的资助

摘　　要：自1999年始的扩招政策实质上与教育标准(进入标准和毕业标准)的设计有关。教育标准会直接对学生的学习激励发生作用,同时,又和劳动力市场的发育水平密切相关。本文将学生的学习激励、劳动力市场的扭曲程度和教育标准的设计置于两期动态博弈的框架下,采用子博弈完美纳什均衡的概念(SPNE)用来讨论学生努力的阶段性差异和不同教育政策的选择逻辑。研究表明:在劳动力市场扭曲程度较大,专业技能可识别性较强时,适宜设计较高的毕业标准;伴随劳动力市场扭曲程度的加剧,则需要提高毕业标准,反之,如果劳动力市场更加透明,降低毕业标准的举措则符合社会福利最大化的原则。同时,学生努力的阶段性差异与劳动力市场的扭曲程度密切相关,因此"进入高等教育序列之后,学生的努力水平大大降低",并非一定成立。"宽进严出"和"严进宽出"的选择是由劳动市场的发育程度、专业技能的可识别性以及学生内在能力共同决定,需要立足于劳动力市场的实际情况,选择符合我国教育发展的制度安排。This paper puts learning incentive of students, labor market distortion and educational standards - making into one framework to analyze how to establish the optimal educational standards based on social welfare. We capture the optimal educational standards and efforts of students under our setting, meanwhile, provide a linear model to analyze the variation of students＇ efforts in different stages and try to explain the logic of different educational policies - making. Our findings are as follows： the optimal entry standards are determined by the two types of parameters such as characteristics of labor market and average ability of students; the optimal graduation standards depends on the productivity of skills, characteristics of labor market and average ability of students; efforts of students are determined by the level of educational standards, characteristics of labor market, and the students＇ ability. Furthermore, difference of efforts between two stages depends on productivity of skills, cost of efforts and marginal utility of entry standards; the choice of educational policies, such as ＂easy to entry and hard to graduate＂ or ＂hard to entry and easy to graduate＂ is determined by characteristics of labor market, the degree of observability of skills and distribution of students＇ ability.

关 键 词：学习激励 劳动力市场 最优教育标准 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]