多寡头不确定条件下的矿山企业期权博弈基本价值研究  

Study on Basic Value of Option Game between Mine Enterprises under Uncertain Conditions of Multi Oligarchs

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作  者:戴剑勇[1] 马蓝[1] 

机构地区:[1]南华大学核资源工程学院,湖南衡阳421001

出  处:《煤炭经济研究》2013年第12期57-60,共4页Coal Economic Research

摘  要:期权博弈方法把实物期权和博弈论结合起来,在不确定性条件和竞争环境下,为企业提供项目的投资估价和决策,以实现投资项目价值的最大化。竞争环境下的矿山企业博弈参与方不再局限于对称双寡头,而是考虑了序贯均衡阶段的多寡头矿山企业,在进行项目投资决策时,可假设投资初期成本各不相同,建立多寡头矿山企业期权博弈基本价值的价值函数和最佳投资时机进行研究。The option game method was combined with the real option and the game theory.Under the uncer tainty conditions and the competitive environment,the project investment estimation and decision of the enter prise in the new period could realize the value maximum of the investment project.The game participators of the mine enterprises under the competitive environment would not be confined by the symmetrical double oligarchs,the multi oligarch mine enterprises at the sequence equilibrium stage should be considered.Dur ing the decision making for the project investment,it was supposed that the initial cost of each investment was different,the value function of the option game basic value should be established for the multi oligarch mine enterprises and would be the best investment opportunity.

关 键 词:矿山投资 期权博弈 多寡头 

分 类 号:F426.21[经济管理—产业经济]

 

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