基于委托代理理论的军用软件定价模型  

Military Software Pricing Model Based on Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：王志勇[1] 王世升 刘海涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]海军工程大学装备经济管理系,武汉430033 [2]海军工程大学勤务学院,天津300450

出　　处：《价值工程》2014年第1期301-304,共4页Value Engineering

摘　　要：对于军用定制软件,通常采用成本导向法进行定价。但是,现有方法在设置成本分担率这一参数时,没有考虑道德风险的影响,导致无法有效激励承包商降低成本。文章分析了军用软件采办中的委托代理关系,利用委托代理理论,分别在信息对称和信息不对称两种情况下,建立了军用软件的目标成本激励定价模型;通过模型的优化,确定了使军方期望效用最大化的成本分担率参数;最后给出了一个算例,并对相关参数变化对采办费用的影响情况进行了分析。实例分析表明,在信息不对称的条件下,可以通过在合同中引入激励机制,使承包商做出更大的努力,以达到控制采办费用的目的。For customized software, the cost-oriented pricing method is usually used. However, when setting the cost sharing rate in existing method, the moral hazard is not considered, which lead to not effective prompting to the contractor to reduce the cost. In this paper, the principal-agent relationship in the acquisition of military software is analyzed. Using the principal-agent theory, target cost incentive pricing models under symmetric information and asymmetric information are given. The contract parameters are determined through model optimizing. Finally a calculation of a practical problem is illustrated and impacts of parameters＂ variety are analyzed. Results demonstrates that with asymmetric information, by introducing incentive mechanism, the defense industry enterprise would pay more effort to control the acquisition expenses.

关 键 词：军用软件 委托代理 目标成本 激励定价 对称信息 非对称信息 

分 类 号：E257[军事—军事理论]