间接庇古税的福利效应分析——以交通污染控制为例  

The Welfare Impact of Indirect Pigouvian Taxation: Sampled with Transportation Pollution

作　　者：李正升[1] 

机构地区：[1]云南师范大学云南华文学院,云南昆明650500

出　　处：《生态经济》2014年第1期62-65,共4页Ecological Economy

基　　金：2013年度云南省哲学社会科学规划项目"城市交通污染控制的价格形成机制及其环境经济政策研究--以昆明为例"(JCZX201301)阶段性成果

摘　　要：经济学认为当机动车污染排放产生负外部性时最优政策工具就是根据外部性的大小征收相应的庇古税,使外部成本内部化。然而由于每一辆机动车的污染排放水平不一,根据污染排放量直接征收庇古税很难实施,在这种情况下,替代性的政策是对与机动车污染排放息息相关的燃油消费进行征税。文章在Diamond模型的基础上,构建了最优间接庇古税模型,分析了间接庇古税的福利效应。研究发现:一是由于机动车使用年限、消费者收入水平、汽车排量选择偏好等影响燃油消费的异质性因素存在,最优间接庇古税只能是次优的;二是最优间接庇古税作为治理机动车污染外部性这种市场失灵的政策工具所起的作用十分有限,对提高整体社会福利水平效率较低。It i.s an economic tenet that when vehicle emissions engender in negative externalities, an optimal policy is to levy Pigouvian taxes upon the externality, internalizing the cost thereupon. However, it would be infeasible to tax each vehicle respectively given that the amount of emission always varies across economic agents. In this case, alternative policy could be taxing gasoline which is closely correlating to emissions. This study aims to establish the most optimal indirect Pigouvian model, based on the Diamond model, and to analyze the welfare impact of that Pigouvian taxation. The study reveals that, 1） optimal indirect Pigouvian taxation is only suboptimum due to the emission variation for each vehicle, the level of which is decided by the useful life of the vehicle, the income of the vehicle proprietor, consumers＇ preference to vehicle displacement, and so on; 2） the optimal indirect Pigouvian taxation, as a policy to correct the market failure in case of vehicle emission, exerts limited influence and contributes little to the welfare of the whole society.

关 键 词：间接庇古税 无谓损失 交通污染 

分 类 号：F810.42[经济管理—财政学]