基于马氏距离的硬件木马检测方法  

An Approach to Detecting Hardware Trojans Based on Mahalanobis Distance

作　　者：王力纬[1] 贾鲲鹏[2] 方文啸[1] 董倩[2] 

机构地区：[1]工业和信息化部电子第五研究所电子元器件可靠性物理及其应用技术重点实验室,广州510610 [2]国防科技信息中心,北京100036

出　　处：《微电子学》2013年第6期817-820,共4页Microelectronics

摘　　要：集成电路芯片在不受控的制造过程中可能会被嵌入恶意电路结构,形成硬件木马,给集成电路芯片的可信度带来极大的安全隐患。传统的测试技术很难发现这些硬件木马。针对这一问题,提出一种基于马氏距离的非破坏性硬件木马检测方法。通过对128位AES(Advanced Encryption Standard)加密电路的功耗仿真实验,对该方法进行验证。实验结果表明,基于马氏距离的硬件木马检测方法能够检测出面积比AES电路小2个数量级的硬件木马。Malicious circuits may be inserted into integrated circuits （IC） as a hardware Trojan during fabrication in uncontrollable foundries, which poses a significant risk in terms of their trusted field operation. Such Trojan circuits are extremely hard to discover with conventional test strategies. A non-destructive approach to detecting hardware Trojan based on Mahalanobis distance was proposed. The approach was validated with a 128-bit advanced encryption standard （AES） cipher circuit using power simulation. Results from experiments showed that Trojans which were 2 orders of magnitude smaller than the AES circuit could be detected by using the proposed Trojan detection approach.

关 键 词：硬件木马 集成电路 芯片安全 木马检测 

分 类 号：TN406[电子电信—微电子学与固体电子学]