城市征地拆迁中谋利型抵制行为的思考  

The Research on the Benefit-seeking Holdout Problem in Land-acquisition and Demolition of City

作　　者：虞晓芬[1] 金细簪[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工业大学经贸管理学院,浙江杭州310014

出　　处：《城市发展研究》2013年第12期I0026-I0028,共3页Urban Development Studies

基　　金：浙江省社科基金项目"城市化进程中征地拆迁抵制行为及管控政策研究"(13NDJC002Z)

摘　　要：近年来,尽管各地不断提高征地拆迁补偿水平、不断完善征地拆迁制度,但征地拆迁过程中的抵制行为甚至冲突依然不断发生。在分析征地拆迁居民预期意愿的基础上,解释了征地拆迁中谋利型①"抵制"行为客观存在的原因,提示在征地拆迁中确实存在反公地困境及机会主义问题,揭示了我国征地拆迁问题的多个面相。建议应该正确对待征地拆迁抵制问题,以公平、公正、严格执法来引导正常的征地拆迁秩序,维护规则的严肃性和权威性,才能打消人们头脑中存在的抵制纠缠可能增加利益的错误念头和侥幸心理。Today, with the system and the compensation of land acquisition improvement perfect, holdout problems in land-acquisition and demolition are not eliminated. Based on analysis the willing of land-acquisition and demolition, this paper explains the reason of Benefit-seeking holdout problem existence objectively and find out there are ＇anti commons＇ dilemma and opportunism problem in land acquisition and demolition which reveals the various aspects of the land-acquisition and demolition problems in china. Therefore, we should face up to holdout problems in land-acquisition and demolition correctly. And we should enforce the law to guide the normal order of landacquisition and demolition, so as to maintain the rule of the seriousness and authority and resist the wrong idea in the minds of people that noncooperation will bring benefits.

关 键 词：征地拆迁 抵制行为 利益博弈 

分 类 号：F301[经济管理—产业经济]