多对一双方匹配市场中的最优化  

Optimization in many-to-one two-sided matching market

作　　者：李建荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学数学科学学院,广州510631

出　　处：《运筹学学报》2013年第4期1-10,共10页Operations Research Transactions

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(No.71301056);广东省自然科学基金(No.S2013040016469)

摘　　要：在双方市场中定义的博弈概念,可以使市场同方参与者的收益同时达到最大.这种最优化存在的理论依据是选择匹配的稳定性.用博弈论的分析与证明方法研究多对一双方匹配市场中的最优化.在替代偏好和LAD(Law of Aggregate Demend)偏好下,证明由企业作选择的选择函数一定是个稳定匹配,由工人做选择的选择函数也是一个稳定匹配.The game-theoretic solutions defined in two-sided market allow the interests of agents on the same side of the market to be simultaneously maximized. The theoretic basis of such kind of optimization is the stability of the selection matching. This paper uses game-theoretic method to study the optimization in many-to-one two-sided matching market. Under the presence of substitutable and LAD（Law of Aggregate Demand） preferences, we prove that the selections made by firms produce a stable matching, so do the selections made by workers.

关 键 词：匹配博弈 稳定匹配 替代偏好 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] F224.32[理学—数学]