基于进化博弈视角的农户耕地保护行为选择研究  

Research on Farmer's Selection of Farmland Protective Behaviors from Perspective of Evolutionary Game

作　　者：钟骁勇[1] 肖泽干[2] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学旅游与城市管理学院,江西南昌330032 [2]赣州市国土资源局土地勘测规划院,江西赣州341000

出　　处：《国土资源科技管理》2013年第6期48-52,共5页Scientific and Technological Management of Land and Resources

基　　金：江西省研究生创新基金项目(YC2012-S066)

摘　　要：当前我国耕地面积不断减少,耕地质量不断退化,国家粮食安全面临严重威胁,耕地保护形势严峻。基于进化博弈视角分析农户耕地保护的行为决策得知:农户的耕地保护行为具有群体效应,农户参与耕地保护和不参与的动态均衡关系,最终取决于两种行为的收益比重,如果选择参与耕地保护的收益低于不参与的选择,那么大多数农户受经济利益诱导,将离开耕地转向非农产业,如选择外出务工等。因此,建议政府提高耕地保护的经济效益,建立耕地保护基金制度,落实完善多种补贴、支持和优惠政策,完善农村社会服务体系来提高农户参与耕地保护的收益,增强农户参与耕地保护的积极性。Now that arable land is shrinking and land quality is increasingly degraded, national food security and farmland protection are facing a serious threat. From the perspective of Evolutionary Game, this paper analyzes the farmers~ behavior choices in land protection and finds out that farmers＇ action in land protection has a group effect. The dynamic equilitarium between the involvement and the non-involvement in the farmland protection ultimately depends on the income proportion of the two actions. If the involvement results in a lower income, then farmers would turn to non agricultural industries, such as doing a migrant job. Therefore, it is recommended that government should raise the economic benefits of farmland protection, establish the system of farmland protection fund, improve a variety of subsidies, support and preferential policies, improve rural social service oriented system to increase farmers＇ benefits in land protection, and make farmers more initiative in protecting the cultivated land.

关 键 词：农户 进化博弈 耕地保护 激励机制 

分 类 号：F301.1[经济管理—产业经济]