国有资本收益分配、新增投资与企业业绩——基于国有资本分配“新政”实施影响的实证检验  

On the Income Distribution of National Capital, New Investments and Corperate Performance——An Empirical Test based on the Effect of Implemention of New Policy of National Capital

作　　者：赵惠萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学商学院,天津300222

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2013年第12期62-73,共12页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：天津市"十二五"教育科学规划课题(CE3007)

摘　　要：随着国有企业改革的不断深化,国家与国有资本收益分配之间关系也不断调整。2007年,国有资本收益分配"新政"要求央企按照一定比例上缴国有资本收益,并在2010年进一步提高了上缴比例。对此,本文运用实证方法检验了现行国有资本收益分配政策在2007年、2010年前后对国有企业增量投资的抑制效果。结论显示,国有资本收益分配有利于降低国有企业管理人员的过度投资行为,有助于减少代理成本和提升企业业绩。这一结论得到了确切验证。With the continuous deepening of state-owned enterprise reform, there is an adjust- ment of relations between the nation and national capital income contribution. In 2007, the new pol- icy of national capital income contribution allows the central enterprises to pay national capital in- come according to the proportion, and increase it in 2010. In view of it, I make an empirical test on the effect of existent state capital income contribution policy on the added investment of state-owned enterprise before and after 2007 and 2010. It shows that national capital income contribution is ben- eficial for decrease the excessive investment behavior of management person of state-owned enterpri- ses, and lower agent cost and promote performance. The conclusion is testified.

关 键 词：国有资本收益分配 新增投资 企业业绩 代理理论 

分 类 号：F126.2[经济管理—世界经济]