PPP项目缔约风险控制框架研究——基于信任提升与维持的视角  

Research on the Controlling Framework of Contracting Risk in PPP Projects:Based on the Promotion and Maintenance of Trust

作　　者：杜亚灵[1] 闫鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津理工大学管理学院,天津300384

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第6期880-886,共7页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71002066)

摘　　要：中国管理情境下的PPP项目通常以履约中再谈判的高发率与低效率为特征,其根源在于投资人关系专用性投资所引发的高度的缔约风险,信任在解决该问题上起着弥补与均衡正式契约的重要作用。以信任对事前信息不对称的治理为切入点,指出信任对PPP项目缔约风险的控制作用,体现在抵制事后机会主义和降低缔约成本上;分析了PPP项目中信任的动态演化过程,提出了依据PPP项目缔约过程中信任的动态演化规律来制定缔约风险控制策略的思路,包括以提高初始信任为导向的投资人选择和基于持续性信任动态演化的合同谈判。PPP projects in the contex of Chinese management are usually characterized by the high incidence and poor efficiency of renegotiation during the performance of contract.It roots in the high contracting risk caused by the investors＇ relationship specific investment, while trust can complement and balance the formal contract in controlling the contracting risk.This paper takes reducing information a- symmetry as the breakthrough point.Firstly, it indicates that the controlling effect of trust on the con- tracting risk in PPP projects is the resisting of ex post opportunism and reducing of the contracting cost. Secondly,the dynamic evolving process of the trust in PPP projects is presented.Finally,accord- ing to the evolution law of trust during the contracting in PPP projects, the propositional strategies for the government to control the contracting risk are presented, including the selection of investor ori- ented to promote the initial trust and the negotiation based on dynamic evolution of continuous trust.

关 键 词：PPP项目 缔约风险 信任 控制权 关系专用性投资 

分 类 号：F284[经济管理—国民经济]