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机构地区:[1]中央财经大学金融学院 [2]清华大学经济管理学院 [3]中国人民大学汉青经济与金融研究院
出 处:《投资研究》2013年第11期46-59,共14页Review of Investment Studies
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目资助,项目批准号“71003113”;教育部“新世纪优秀人才培养计划”资助;中央财经大学“中央财经大学青年科研创新团队支持计划”资助
摘 要:在股权分置改革完成后的全流通时代,我国上市公司控制权市场正全方位形成。本文选取全流通条件下沪深两市61家上市公司共63起大宗股权转让交易为研究样本,在以10%为控制权基准的情况下,采用大宗股权溢价法估算出全流通时代中国上市公司的平均控制权价值为3.28%。进一步研究发现:控制权价值与转让比例、公司业绩、两权分离度呈正相关关系,与独立董事比例反向变动,而且外资增持的公司控制权价值较高,外资减持的公司控制权价值较低。最后,本文对产生股权转让溢价的过度支付假说和信息优先假说进行检验,没有发现支持这两种假说的证据,同时,基于期权定价理论对样本中限售股价格进行调整,进一步证实了中国上市公司控制权价值的存在性。Stepping into a full circulation period after the reform of non-tradable shares, the corporate control market of public companies in China is developing in all aspects. We select 63 block exchanges that involved 61 companies listed on the Shang- hai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as sample and use a 10-percent base standard. With the measurement of large equity premi- um, we estimate that the value of corporate control is 3.28 percent on average under full circulation background. As predicted by theory, higher control value are associated with larger proportion of exchange, better corporate performances, greater separa- tion of ownership and control and lower ratio of independent directors. We also find that control value increases when acquir- ers are from foreign companies and that it decreases when the sellers are foreign. Finally, we examine two alternative explana- tions for block premium: the superior-information hypothesis and the overpayment hypothesis, however, we find no evidence for either of the hypothesis. And we also adjust the price of restricted stocks in our sample based on option pricing theory thus confirming the validity of the value of corporate control.
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