实际控制人性质对上市公司及其高管违规处罚的影响研究  

作　　者：张春霞[1,2] 陆璐 李志生[3] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学经济学院博士后流动站 [2]中国农业银行博士后流动站 [3]中南财经政法大学金融学院

出　　处：《投资研究》2013年第11期101-120,共20页Review of Investment Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目号:71271214,71202019和71232003)的资助

摘　　要：中国投资者对股票市场信心的缺失,很大原因在于金融市场的不完善造成的上市公司的违法违规行为,而监管机构的选择性执法现象更加重了这种现象。为了对这种现象进行研究,本文以2003-2011年我国上市公司及其高管因违法违规行为而受到证监会、交易所或财政部等部门处罚的事件为研究对象,分析实际控制人性质对上市公司及其高管违规处罚轻重程度的影响。研究发现:实际控制人有政府背景的上市公司因违规而受到的处罚更重,并且政府背景越强,处罚越重;与此相反,实际控制人有政府背景的上市公司高管因违规而受到的处罚却更轻。进一步研究表明,实际控制人是否具有外资背景也会对违规处罚的轻重产生一定影响。The public's lack of confidence in the stock market is largely due to listed companies' various law-breaking activities caused by the imperfection of Chinese financial market. The most important is selective enforcement of regulations towards it, so that this phenomenon becomes more and more serious. In order to study this phenomenon, the punishment events of Chi-nese listed companies and its executives by regulators such as CSRC(China Securities Regulatory Commission), exchange and the Treasury Department have been chosen as the research sample. Based on the data obtained, the article discusses the in-fluence of ultimate controller to the violation penalty severity degree. The results show that different nature of the ultimate owners has a significantly different impact on violation penalty severity degree both for listed companies itself and its execu-tives. The regulators impose tougher penalty on listed company whose ultimate controller has government background, while the executives in these state related companies could get lighter penalties. Also, whether the listed company's ultimate control-ler has foreign background has some impact on the severity of sanctions.

关 键 词：实际控制人性质 违规处罚 上市公司及高管 

分 类 号：D922.287[政治法律—经济法学]