工程建设中的施工与监理串谋分析  

Analysis of Collusion between Contractors and Supervisors in Constructions

作　　者：赵磊[1] 钟胜[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学商学院,四川成都610064

出　　处：《西南交通大学学报》2013年第6期1136-1141,共6页Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70873086)

摘　　要：为避免工程建设中因利益驱动及信息不对称出现监理方和承包方的串谋行为,运用规制理论,引入委托人-监督者-代理人三层组织结构,建立了业主对承包方和监理方的一对多道德风险模型,进行了工程管理的定量化研究.研究结果表明:在基于工程量清单报价模式下,招标合同收益值、承包方努力成本、业主对承包方的罚金、监理方受贿比例都与代理成本正相关,业主对串谋行为的发现概率及处罚力度与代理成本负相关.业主应根据自身的惩处能力设计奖励与惩罚机制,当业主的惩处能力小于一定阈值时,应增加对监理方的奖励,以实现在激励承包方与监理方努力工作的同时,最大限度的防止串谋行为的发生.In order to avoid collusions between supervisors and contractors due to benefit drive and asymmetrical information in constructions,a moral hazard model with a single principal and multiple agents was set up by using regulation theory and introducing a hierarchical principal-supervisor-agent structure,for quantitative research of engineering management. The result shows that under the bidding evaluation mode with bill of quantities,the profit value of bidding contracts,the effort cost of contractors,the penalty imposed by owners on contractors,and the bribery proportion of supervisors are all positively correlated to the agent cost; but the detection probability of collusions by owners and the intensity of punishment are negatively correlated to the agent cost. In addition,owners should devise the reward and punishment mechanism according to their own capacity of punishment. When owners＇ capacity of punishment is lower than a certain value,they should increase the rewards to supervisors in order to encourage the efforts of contractors and supervisors and prevent the collusions to the maximum extent.

关 键 词：工程建设 承包方 监理方 串谋 规制 

分 类 号：TU712.2[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]