确证悖论的认识论解  

An Epistemological Solution to the Paradox of Confirmation

作　　者：顿新国[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学哲学系,江苏南京210046 [2]南京大学现代逻辑与逻辑应用研究所,江苏南京210046

出　　处：《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第5期23-26,共4页Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"归纳悖论与确证逻辑新探"(11BZX061);教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目"确证理论及其语用趋向与应用研究"(08JC720006);江苏省社会科学基金项目"形式知识论研究"(10ZXC009)

摘　　要：确证悖论的构造过程表明,它本质上是关于信念(假说)合理接受的认识论悖论;对其解悖史的系统考察可揭示各类代表性方案均明显依赖某些认识论因素。在充分挖掘确证悖论之认识论意蕴基础上,可通过修改主流方案所默认的逻辑上的确证等值条件,在认识论上消解确证悖论,并对这一消解给予有力辩护。By reconstructing the Paradox of Confirmation, it is revealed that the paradox is essentially an epistemic paradox about rational belief or hypothesis acceptance. The history of solution to Paradox of Confirma- tion shows all the main representative solutions depend on some epistemological factors clearly. After？ carefully examining the epistemological implications of the paradox, this paper proposes based on modifying the logical equivalence condition of confirmation, and then ingly. an epistemological solution to it the solution is justified convincingly.

关 键 词：确证悖论 认识论 解决方案 

分 类 号：B819[哲学宗教—逻辑学]