环境污染群体性突发事件的协同演化机制--基于信息传播和权利博弈的视角  

Co-evolutionary Mechanism of Mass Emergency Derived from Environmental Pollution: Based on the Viewpoint of Information Shortage and Right Absence

作　　者：刘德海[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学经济计量分析与预测研究中心,辽宁大连116025 [2]数学与数量经济学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《公共管理学报》2013年第4期102-113,142,共12页Journal of Public Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(70901016);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71271045)

摘　　要：在环境污染群体性事件的发生演化和应急处置过程中,存在着信息传播与利益博弈之间协同演化现象。本文从信息传播和利益博弈协同演化的视角,解构了环境污染群体性突发事件的演化过程。考虑到协商谈判和暗箱操作的权利博弈格局,以及信息匮乏、信息过剩和虚假信息等复杂特征,建立了环境污染群体性事件的协同演化博弈模型,结合渤海溢油事件和青海宜化事件分析了地方政府采取不同的利益调整策略与信息传播策略的协同演化关系。研究表明:在协商谈判的权利博弈结构下,周边群众高估赔偿值将导致抗议行动的长期化,地方政府和污染企业信息匮乏将延缓事态妥善处置的过程。在暗箱操作的权利博弈结构下,随着地方政府加大舆情引导措施,环境污染群体性突发事件发生的周期逐渐增大,而且均衡状态下参加抗议人数的比例也逐渐下降。本文创新点在于从信息传播和利益博弈协同演化的视角,解构了环境污染群体性突发事件的演化规律,同时考虑了信息匮乏、信息过剩和虚假信息等复杂的信息特征。In the evolutionary course and emergency management of mass emergency derived from environmental pollution,there has co-evolution phenomenon between information diffusion and right game. The paper analyzes the evolutionary course of mass emergency derived from environmental pollution from the viewpoint of co-evolution. Considering the right game structures of negotiation and black box operation,the information characters of absence,redundancy and misstatement,the co-evolutionary game model of mass emergency derived from environmental pollution is build. The co-evolutionary relationship between information diffusion and benefit adjustment is discussed,based Bohai Oil Spilling Accident and Qinghai Yihua Accident. Under the game structure of negotiation,the protest of nearby residents will be permanent if they overestimate compensation,and the settlement course of the mass emergency will be delayed if local governments and polluting enterprises are short of corresponding information. Under the game structure of black box operation,the evolutionary period becomes longer,and the number of protesters declines along with the more effective public opinion guided measurements. Expanding on the previous research approach of emergency management,this study analyzes the evolutionary mechanism of mass emergency derived from environmental pollution from the perspective of co-evolutionary mechanism between information diffusion and right game. In the same time,the complex information characteristics including absence,redundancy and misstatement are considered.

关 键 词：群体性突发事件 演化博弈 环境污染 协同演化 信息传播 权利博弈 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]