A cost-sharing method for the multi-level economic lot-sizing game  

作　　者：LI GaiDi DU DongLei XU DaChuan ZHANG RuYao 

机构地区：[1]Department of Applied Mathematics, Beijing University of Technology [2]Faculty of Business Administration, University of New Brunswick,Fredericton [3]School of Mathematical Sciences, Fudan University

出　　处：《Science China(Information Sciences)》2014年第1期255-263,共9页中国科学（信息科学）（英文版）

基　　金：supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.11201013);supported in part by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada(Grant No.283103);supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.60773185);Scientific Research Common Program of Beijing Municipal Commission of Education(Grant No.KM201210005033)

摘　　要：Multi-level economic lot-sizing models have been extensively investigated under diferent multi-level structure assumptions. In this paper, we consider the cooperative game associated with the multi-level economic lot-sizing problem. We present a cost-sharing method for the multi-level economic lot-sizing game, under a mild condition, which is cross-monotonic, competitive, and approximate cost recovery.Multi-level economic lot-sizing models have been extensively investigated under diferent multi-level structure assumptions. In this paper, we consider the cooperative game associated with the multi-level economic lot-sizing problem. We present a cost-sharing method for the multi-level economic lot-sizing game, under a mild condition, which is cross-monotonic, competitive, and approximate cost recovery.

关 键 词：multi-level economic lot-sizing game cross-monotonic COMPETITIVE approximate cost recovery 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]