基于委托—代理的高校科研项目管理激励建模研究  

Principal-Agent-Oriented Modeling Research to Scientific Research Program Managements and Incentives in Higher Education

作　　者：李恒[1] 王小绪[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学科技处,江苏南京210094

出　　处：《南京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第1期54-57,共4页Journal of Nanjing University of Science and Technology：Social Sciences

基　　金：江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科研研究项目资助(编号:2010SJD30057)

摘　　要：如何制定激励机制是高校科研项目管理的重要问题。本文基于委托—代理理论,建立了教师参与项目成果分享的激励模型,分析了在信息对称和信息非对称两种情况下的最优代理合同。分析结果表明,在信息对称情况下,存在帕累托最优合同,教师不承担项目风险,分享的项目成果份额为零;在信息不对称情况下,教师承担的风险水平、分享的科研成果份额与其风险规避度负相关,教师越规避风险,分享的成果份额越小。It is of vital importance for higher education to formulate the incentive system in scientific research program manage- ment. Based on principal - agent theory, an encouragement model is set up, where teachers share research outputs. The optimal contract is analyzed in both situations of symmetric and asymmetric information. It confirms the existence of Pareto optimal con- tract in symmetric information, where teachers are unwilling to take program risks and share no output profit. While in the case of asymmetric information, there is a negative correlation between teachers＇ risk level and their profit share. Higher degree of risk aversion entails lower share of output profit.

关 键 词：高校科研项目管理 激励模型 委托代理 努力水平 

分 类 号：G311[文化科学]