农业补贴资金管理中的博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Financial Management of Agricultural Subsidies

作　　者：蒋飞海[1] 马小丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]西昌学院,四川西昌615013

出　　处：《西昌学院学报（自然科学版）》2013年第4期52-54,共3页Journal of Xichang University(Natural Science Edition)

摘　　要：目前我国已经进入工业反哺农业的历史阶段,中央财政补贴成了促进农业发展的重要因素。由于地方财政薄弱,中央财政的农业补贴资金往往被地方部门截留,到不了农户手中,致使农业补贴效果大打折扣。本文拟通过建立博弈模型来分析实践中国家农业政策执行监督部门与地方农业主管部门的关系。并从双方的博弈关系中得出几点建议与思考,供规范与加强财政支农资金管理,完善农业财政补贴监管机制参考。At present, China has entered the Age of Industry-financed agriculture. The financial subsidies of central government have become an important factor in agricultural development. Given the present condition of weak financial, the local government is inclined to unwarranted diversion of resources from designated uses. In this Article, it uses game theory knowledge, through the creation of game model to analyze the relationship between national, agricultural policy supervisory authority and the local agricultural sector. Game analysis of agricultural subsidies will bring some suggestions for improving the monitoring of agricultural subsidy mechanism.

关 键 词：博弈原理 农业补贴 博弈模型 最优均衡 

分 类 号：F320[经济管理—产业经济] F812.8