试析维特根斯坦《逻辑哲学论》中的主体观  

Discussions on the Viewpoint of Subject in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus

作　　者：李高荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学马克思主义学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《兰州学刊》2013年第12期12-16,共5页

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金第54批面上资助项目的阶段性研究成果。(项目编号:2013M542071)

摘　　要：表面上,维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中提出了两种主体:认识主体或表象主体和形而上主体,并借用前者论证了后者的存在;事实上,维氏的表象主体只是用来为形而上主体服务的,他更看重后者。这与他的哲学趣旨是相关的:他十分关心人生的意义问题。借用形而上主体,他不但给出了认识的界限,也为生命的意义找到了方向——要想幸福地生活,必须和世界和谐一致。Although Wittgenstein proposes two kinds of subject in Tractates Logico - Philosophicus, i.e. the understanding subject and the metaphys- ical subject, and he demonstrates the latter＇ s existence making use of the former, in fact, the understanding subject just works for the metaphysical one, and he pays more attention to the latter. Obviously, this thought is related to his philosophical interest that he is concerned about the question of life＇s meaning very much. Taking advantage of the metaphysical subject, Wittgenstein not only marks off the boundary of understanding, but finds the orienta- tion for life＇ meaning, that is, if you want to have a happy life, you must get along harmoniously with the world.

关 键 词：神秘之域 认识主体 形而上主体 

分 类 号：B14[哲学宗教—世界哲学]