混合扩展审计博弈与风险决策优化  

Modeling and optimization of risk decision based on mixed extended audit game

作　　者：朱佳俊 覃朝勇[2] 

机构地区：[1]江南大学商学院,江苏无锡214122 [2]广西大学数学与信息学院,广西南宁530004

出　　处：《广西大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第6期1491-1497,共7页Journal of Guangxi University（Natural Science Edition）

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71261002);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(JUSRP1071);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2011M500787)

摘　　要：为研究隐藏行为下扩展审计博弈的期望收益与策略矩阵、违规倾向与利益转移,从混合审计博弈与决策优化出发,构建了基于不完全信息的扩展审计博弈模型,通过对扩展审计成本和收益分析,度量扩展审计风险,以提高审计博弈风险分析、策略评估的准确性和可信度。给出了一个实例,用以演示扩展审计博弈过程,以证实该方法的有效性。In order to study expected return and strategy matrix, irregular tendency and benefits transfer of the extended auditing game under hidden action, an extended audit game model was built based on incomplete information from the view point of mixed auditing game and decision optimiza- tion. Costs and benefits of extended audit game were analysed in order to measure the audit risk and to improve the accuracy and the reliability of risk analysis and strategy evaluation in audit game. An example concerning practical problems is given to demonstrate the process of extended audit game and to validate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

关 键 词：扩展审计 审计风险 博弈论 纳什均衡 决策 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]