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作 者:刘金娥[1]
出 处:《厦门理工学院学报》2013年第4期77-82,共6页Journal of Xiamen University of Technology
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目(71071132);教育部人文社会科学规划项目(09YJA790118);福建省社会科学规划项目(2012C079;2012B026)
摘 要:房价的形成是一个非常复杂的博弈机制,是房地产市场主要参与者从自身利益出发与其他参与主体进行博弈的结果。利用进化博弈论分析房地产市场主要参与者之间的行为,发现中央政府基于地方政府的违规概率和监督成本选择其监督行为,地方政府基于中央政府的监督和惩罚力度选择其行为,房地产商基于寻租成本、政府的设租概率和惩罚力度选择寻租行为,信息的不对称使得房地产商选择垄断价格策略,而购房者大多选择即期购买。为促进房地产市场的健康持续发展,中央政府应加大对地方政府违规行为的处罚概率和力度,同时加大对地方政府的奖励力度,政府应加大对房地产商违规行为的惩罚力度,并进一步降低房地产市场信息的不对称性;房地产购买者应保持高度的理性,作出理性的购房选择。The setting of housing prices is a very complex game system. It is the compromise between the primary market participants on behalf of one's own interest. An analysis of the primary participants in the real estate market on the evolutionary game theory has indicated that the central government tends to conduct supervision on the violations probability of local government and the supervision cost, and that the local governments chooses to act on the central government's supervision and penalties, while the real estate developers choose the rent-seeking behaviors based on its cost, the governmental renting probability and penalty intensity. Information asymmetry allures the real estate developers to choose monopoly pricing strategies, while buyers choose purchase at sight. To promote the healthy and sustainable development of the real estate market, the central government should increase the intensity of punishment for the illegal behavior of local government or the real estate business, and the intensity of incentives for the outstanding performance of the local government. Real estate buyers should learn to make wise and informed purchase decision and the government should try to reduce information asymmetry in the real estate market by more frequent disclosures to the ordinary consumers.
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