多代理人条件下混合激励合约的改进研究  

Research on the Improvement of Mixed Incentive Contracts with Multi-agents

作　　者：朱浩[1] 傅强[1] 王艺颖[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《广东商学院学报》2013年第6期53-58,共6页Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(13YJA630018);教育部高校博士点基金资助项目(20100191110033);重庆大学研究生科技创新基金项目(CDJXS12021113)

摘　　要：设计有效激励合约一直是治理委托代理合作的关键。将代理人的努力投入和拆台两种行为同时纳入传统的委托代理模型,比较分析信息不对称条件下平均支付激励合约、锦标赛激励合约和两者的混合激励合约对代理人行为水平的影响,结果表明:混合激励合约是一种比平均支付激励合约和锦标赛激励合约更为有效的激励合约,它能有效治理"平均支付带来搭便车、锦标赛激励导致拆台"的代理人行为取向难题;混合激励合约的有效性取决于平均支付激励合约中的产出分享比例和锦标赛激励合约中的报酬差距这两个关键变量;数值模拟分析显示,在相对低报酬差距情形下,能找到最优产出分享比例并最大化委托人的收益。The design of effective incentive contracts has been the key to enhancing the level of cooperation between the principal and its agents. By introducing work and sabotage into the traditional principal-agent model, this paper compares the effects of three different incentive contracts on the behavior of agents, namely average-pay contract, tournament contract and mixed cbntract. It finds that mixed contract is better than the other two contracts, so it can effectively solve the problem of ＂average-pay brings free ride, and tournament leads to sabotage＂, and the effect of mixed incentive contracts depends on the two key variables, such as the proportion of output and the pay gap of tournament. The data analysis indicates that the optimal output-sharing proportion to maximize the principal＇s benefits can be found on the condition of low pay gap.

关 键 词：委托代理 平均支付合约 锦标赛合约 混合激励合约 拆台行为 报酬差距 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F272.92