民营化改革后铁路行业的价格规制及线路维持——以日本为例  

Price Regulation and Institutional Design to Maintain Local Railway Network after Privatization Reform——Take Japan as An Example

作　　者：王惠贤[1] 李宏舟[2] 

机构地区：[1]大连外国语大学日本语学院,辽宁大连116044 [2]东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《财经论丛》2014年第1期91-96,共6页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

摘　　要：鉴于民营化改革后的铁路运输公司仍具有区域垄断的性质,日本政府导入了区域间标尺竞争下的价格上限规制。该机制保留了收益率规制的某些特点,但通过横向比较和纵向比较引入了竞争机制。同样,为了保证居民的交通权,日本政府通过财政补贴和网运分离等制度设计,基本上维护了地方铁路网络的完整性。我国2013年铁路体制改革的实质是政企分开,改革本身并没有改变网运一体化下铁路运输的自然垄断性及其公益性,因此以政企分开为借口,完全实施市场机制是缺乏理论依据的。In view of the monopoly nature of railway companies and the transportation rights of residents after privatiza- tion, the Japanese government introduced price-cap regulation along with yardstick competition among regions, and maintained the integrity of the local railway network through various institutional designs. China＇s railway reform in 2013 is essentially to separate government administration from business management, which does not change the monopoly and non-profit nature of the railway transportation. Consequently, implementing market mechanism in pricing under the excuse of reform is lack of the- oretical basis.

关 键 词：区域间标尺竞争 价格上限规制 自然垄断 日本铁路改革 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]