政府监管对银行稳健性的影响研究——基于中国上市商业银行的实证检验  

The Influence of Government Regulation on Bank Stability——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Commercial Banks

作　　者：曲洪建[1] 张相贤[2,3] 王宇明[4] 

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学,上海201620 [2]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871 [3]威海市商业银行博士后工作站,山东威海264200 [4]东华大学,上海200051

出　　处：《当代经济管理》2014年第1期79-84,共6页Contemporary Economic Management

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年基金项目(12YJC630157);上海工程技术大学项目(2012pg33;校启-2012-09);山东省博士后创新项目专项资金资助项目(201103017);山东省软科学项目(2012RKA10011)

摘　　要：以2006～2012年16家上市银行为样本，实证分析了特许权价值、资本监管、隐性保险对银行稳健性的影响。研究结果表明：特许权价值对银行风险存在自律效应，对银行绩效和银行流动性没有显著影响；资本监管能够降低银行风险，然而却降低了银行流动性，对银行盈利性没有显著影响；隐性保险制度对于稳健性差的银行保护较多；银行规模越大，银行稳健性越好，即存在“大而不倒”的情况；资本杠杆和经营杠杆对银行稳健性的影响不大：次贷危机对银行稳健性的影响不大，但金融危机对银行稳健性的影响依然存在。Using a sample of 16 listed banks during 2006 and 2012, this paper empirically tested how franchise value, capital regulation and implicit insurance affect bank stability. We found that： franchise value has self-discipline effect on bank risk, but it has no significant effect on the performance of banks and bank liquidity; capital regulation can reduce the risk of banks and reduce the bank liquidity, but it has no signifi- cant effect on bank profitability; implicit insurance system protects for＂ implicit insurance system protects less robust banks more.＂ ; bigger bank size means better bank stability, that is ＂ too big to fail＂ ; capital leverage and operating leverage have little effect on bank robustness; subprime crisis has little effect on bank stability, but the impact of the financial crisis on bank stability still exist.

关 键 词：特许权价值 资本监管 隐性保险 银行稳健性 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]