关于欧盟航空碳税应对策略的Stackelberg博弈模型分析  

Analysis on the strategies of European Union's airline carbon tax with Stackelberg game models

作　　者：乔晗[1] 宋楠[2] 高红伟[3] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学管理学院,北京100190 [2]哈尔滨理工大学管理学院,哈尔滨150080 [3]青岛大学数学科学学院,青岛266071

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2014年第1期158-167,共10页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71003057;71373262;71171120);山东省自然科学基金(ZR2010GQ001)

摘　　要：本文首次应用非合作博弈方法研究了欧盟航空碳税的应对策略.将其他国家应对欧盟航空碳税的策略分为四种:不抵制、拒绝交纳、反制征税和可置信威胁,通过建立Stackelberg模型研究了航空碳税博弈中双方国家和航空公司的最优选择,并对这四种应对策略进行了比较.分析结果表明,"拒绝交纳"航空碳税比"反制征税"效果好,理论上验证了我国目前正在采取的应对策略是当前最优的.本文的创新在于研究了航空碳税这一新的重要国际问题,首次将航空碳税的应对措施归纳为四种,并且建立Stackelberg博弈模型对这一问题开展定量分析.This paper is the first attempt to use the non-cooperation game theory to study the strategies of airline carbon tax from EU. Based on inducing four scenarios, non-resistance, refusal of payment, retaliatory duties and creditable threat, Stackelberg game models are developed to find the optimal strategies of countries. The results show that the strategy of refusal of payment, which China is taking step, is superior to the retaliatory duties. The main contribution of this paper is to study a new important international issue, airline carbon tax, summarize four coping strategies and analyze this issue by establishing Stackelberg game models for the first time.

关 键 词：航空碳税 碳排放 博弈论 均衡 政策分析 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] X22[理学—数学]